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ABSTRACT 
A photonuclear interrogation method was experimentally assessed for the 
detection of shielded nuclear materials.  Proof-of-Concept assessment was 
performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) TA-18 facility and 
used the INEEL VARITRON electron accelerator.  Experiments were performed 
to assess and characterize the delayed neutron emission responses for different 
nuclear materials with various shield configurations using three “nominal” 
electron beam energies; 8-, 10-, and 11-MeV.  With the exception of highly 
enriched uranium (HEU), the nuclear materials assessed represent material types 
commonly encountered in commerce.  The specific nuclear materials studied 
include a solid 4.8-kg HEU sphere, a 5-kg multiple-object, depleted uranium 
(DU) [uranium with about 0.2% enrichment with U-235] target, and two 11-kg 
thorium disks.  The shield materials selected include polyethylene, borated-
polyethylene, and lead.  Experimental results, supported with numerical 
predictions, have shown that the photonuclear interrogation technique is quite 
capable of detecting shielded nuclear material via the direct measurement of the 
photofission-induced delayed neutron emissions.  To identify or discriminate 
between nuclear material types (i.e., depleted uranium, HEU, and thorium), a 
ratio of delayed neutron counts at two different beam energies is utilized.  This 
latter method, referred to as the dual-beam energy ratio Figure-of-Merit, allows 
one to differentiate among the three nuclear material types. 
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Proof-of-Concept Assessment of a Photofission-
Based Interrogation System for the Detection of 
Shielded Nuclear Material 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Smuggling of nuclear material, especially highly enriched uranium (HEU) [uranium having at least 
80% enrichment with U-235], within normal land, sea, and air commerce is a significant national and 
international concern.  Cargo (or transport) containers alone carry at least 70 percent of all US 
import/export merchandise.  HEU is of paramount concern due to its serious proliferation issue and its 
ease of shielding due to the inherently low radiation emissions.  Unfortunately, nuclear material detection 
is only one of many higher-priority/higher-occurrence, contraband items requiring detection by most 
inspection agencies.  Fortunately, these agencies, such as US Customs, are becoming increasingly 
confident in x-ray inspection technologies and their capabilities (i.e. active interrogation techniques) to 
assist in the inspections. 
Already commercial vendors have developed accelerator-based x-ray systems to perform 
transmission and backscatter imaging and, in some cases, have used neutron generators for neutron 
radiography.  Unfortunately, these commercial systems are not adequate to address the nuclear smuggling 
issue; however, integrating an applicable nuclear detection system within an existing or commercially-
developed inspection system may be the most acceptable and cost-effective option to address the nuclear 
smuggling concern. 
It is now widely accepted that active interrogation methods will be required to detect the presence, 
or confirm the absence, of shielded HEU.  The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL), in collaboration with Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), has focused on a 
photonuclear stimulation of nuclear materials within a cargo container or truck using electron accelerators 
producing electrons having kinetic energies up to 12 MeV.  Specifically, high-energy photons (i.e., 
bremsstrahlung) produced by an electron accelerator, stimulate photonuclear processes within an 
inspected object.  The resulting neutrons are detected between each accelerator pulse and are used to 
characterize nuclear materials and identify HEU. 
The basic technical approach supporting this active interrogation assessment is presented in 
Section 2 below2.  The photonuclear stimulation was performed using a selectable -energy [2 - 12 MeV], 
transportable, electron accelerator.  This accele rator and the specific interrogation technique used in this 
assessment are described in Section 3 below3.  Numerical predicted results, using mono-energetic 
electron beams, are presented in Section 0 below4.  The experimental assessment was performed in two 
phases: initial tests in December of 1999 and follow-on tests in May of 2000.  Section 5 below5 describes 
these tests and presents the associated results.  The final section presents the conclusions and 
recommendations of this technology assessment. 
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2. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
Electron accelerators with energies below 12-MeV have found considerable industrial and medical 
applications and many, especially below 8-MeV, are field transportable and are used for various 
radiography applications.  These accelerators generate bremsstrahlung (i.e., energetic photons) having 
energies up to the maximum electron beam energy.  The maximum photon energy in a bremsstrahlung 
spectrum is called the end-point energy.  The proposed active interrogation concept for this nuclear 
smuggling application leverages on these established accelerator applications and utilizes the ability to 
produce very penetrating photons.  The system will be capable of not only detecting concealed/shielded 
nuclear material, but also allowing discrimination of HEU from other nuclear materials. 
The high-energy portion (>6 MeV) of the bremsstrahlung photon spectrum from an electron 
accelerator will produce copious quantities of high-energy photons (i.e., > 109 photons/s) capable of 
penetrating through most shielding configurations.  For example, better than 25 percent of 8- and 12-MeV 
photons will be transmitted through 2.66-cm and 2.44-cm of lead shielding, respectively, and more than 
10 percent will penetrate through 4.42-cm and 3.98-cm, respectively.  These transmitted energetic 
photons may then contribute to the desired photonuclear effects in the shielded nuclear materials. 
For the nuclear materials of interest in this assessment, Table 1 presents photonuclear threshold 
energies.  These energies represent the minimum amount of photon energy required to induce a 
photonuclear reaction in that element.  Neutrons from a photoneutron reaction, (g,n), are emitted promptly 
after the reaction occurs.  Photofission reactions, (g,fission), emit both prompt and delayed neutrons.  The 
latter occur from the decay of the unstable, fission fragments.  Due to the similarity of these threshold 
energies, especially for the photofission process, and based on the inherent capabilities of most 
commercial accelerator systems, it is extremely difficult to exploit the thresholds for material 
identification/discrimination.  However, the delayed neutron emissions are a direct indicator of nuclear 
material. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the total photonuclear yield and the photofission cross sections (Ref 1), 
respectively, for the nuclear materials of interest in this assessment.  Of particular note are the 
photofission cross section differences in Figure 2 for each element beginning at approximately 8-MeV.  
The total photonuclear yield cross section includes the photofission contribution.  Many of the energetic, 
induced photoneutrons and delayed neutrons will escape the shielded configurations and may be detected.  
Nuclear material identification is possible by comparing the induced-neutron emissions per beam 
coulomb measured at one electron beam energy to that of another electron beam energy.  In this report, 
this method is referred to as the “dual-beam energy” ratio Figure-of-Merit (FOM). 
Table 1.  Selected photonuclear energy thresholds. 
 Interaction Process  U-235  U-238  Th-232  
 ( g,n) [MeV]  5.3  6.1  6.4  
 (g,fission) [MeV]  5.8  5.8  6.0  
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Figure 1.  Total photonuclear yield cross sections for selected nuclear isotopes. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Photofission cross sections for selected nuclear isotopes. 
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3. INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE 
The Gamma-Neutron Threshold (GNT) active interrogation technology (Ref 2) was used as the 
basis of the numerical predictions and in performing the experimental assessment.  The GNT technology 
is shown schematically in Figure 3.  The system consists of a unique, transportable , selectable-energy (2 
to 12-MeV) electron accelerator [VARITRON] and a custom-built, helium-3 based, neutron detection 
system.  The interrogated target is typically positioned (centered) at one-meter from the x-ray source (i.e., 
converter) and one meter from the detector.  It has been successfully demonstrated with both nuclear and 
non-nuclear weapon systems. 
The pulsed, electron accelerator of the GNT system is a field-deployed device capable of producing 
bremsstrahlung photons having a continuous energy spectrum up to the maximum electron beam energy.  
The accelerator controls allow user-selection, control, and monitoring of various operational parameters.  
To allow selectable -energy operation, an on-board, magnetic spectrometer has been incorporated into the 
VARITRON design to provide a kinetic energy characterization of the electron beam.  Different tungsten 
collimator shapes help define the forward-directed, electron-induced, pulsed x-rays. 
The highly penetrating energetic x-rays interact in an interrogated object (typically one-meter from 
the x-ray source) and induce neutrons via direct photoneutron and/or photofission interactions.  The 
neutrons are detected with a tripod-mounted, custom-built detector connected to a portable, multi-channel 
 
Figure 3.  Selected interrogation technique. 
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 scalar acquisition system.  The detector assembly (using four helium-3 detectors) has been specifically 
designed to operate in a very intense, pulsed x-ray environment.  For a selected electron beam energy 
operation, the detected neutrons, measured between accelerator pulses, have a time-dependent response 
that allows the identification of delayed neutrons.  These delayed neutrons, resulting from the fission 
process, are separable in time from the prompt neutron signature.  The photofission process was the focus 
of this assessment. 
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4. NUMERICAL PREDICTIONS 
Initial numerical predictions using 2-11 MeV electrons were documented in August of 1999 
(Ref 3) and updated in September of 2000 (Ref 4) to include extended emission response data for a 12-
MeV electron beam operation.  All numerical assessments focused on monoenergetic  electron beams and 
three nuclear material types (i.e., HEU, DU, and thorium) expected to be available at the LANL TA-18 
facility.  LANL provided information on an ~ 5-kg HEU (93-percent enriched) target consisting of four 
hemispherical shells.  This amount of HEU material was within the critical safety requirements for these 
tests.  The DU target consisted of four plates (enriched to 0.2-percent in U-235) with a combined weight 
of 4.37 kg.  The final nuclear material studied was 2.74-kg thorium having the same dimensions as the 
DU.  The mass difference between the DU and thorium targets was due to different physical densities. 
The numerical assessment report (Ref 4) includes various nuclear material type and shielding 
configurations; Table 2 summarizes predictive results for the nuclear materials only (i.e., without 
shielding materials).  In each case the nuclear material was centered at one meter from the interrogating 
photon source and one meter from the GNT photoneutron detector assembly.  The beam energies 
indicated are those corresponding to mono-energetic electrons striking a bremsstrahlung-producing, 
tungsten target (as used in the GNT technique).  Included in this table is the nuclear material type,  
Table 2.  Unshielded Nuclear Material Delayed Responses. 
Material 
Type 
 Electron 
Beam Energy 
(MeV) 
 
Delayed Response 
(Counts/Coul./kg) 
 
Delayed Response/
8-MeV Response 
HEU  6.5  1.4E4  0.10 
  8  1.4E5  1.00 
  9  4.3E5  3.07 
  10  1.0E6  7.14 
  11  2.2E6  15.71 
  12  4.2E6  30.00 
DU  6.5  2.2E4  0.07 
  8  2.5E5  1.00 
  9  6.8E5  2.72 
  10  1.4E6  5.06 
  11  3.0E6  12.00 
  12  5.6E6  22.40 
Th  6.5  1.5E4  0.09 
  8  2.2E5  1.00 
  9  5.1E5  2.32 
  10  8.9E5  4.05 
  11  1.5E6   6.82 
  12  2.5E6  11.36 
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the predicted delayed counts/coulomb/kg (corresponding to neutrons detected within 1.485 to 7.665 ms 
after each accelerator pulse), and a ratio of the delayed count responses for different beam energy 
operations.  As seen in this table for a given nuclear material type, the delayed neutron response increases 
with the electron beam energy.  This increase in response versus electron energy is driven largely by 
increases in the photofission cross section (see Figure 2).  A non-nuclear material will have no (or “zero”) 
delayed neutron response.  To define a figure-of-merit for comparing and/or discriminating between 
nuclear material types and different electron beam energies, a specific dual-beam energy figure-of-merit 
(FOM) ratio was developed.  This FOM was selected as the ratio of the delayed neutron response for a 
given accelerator beam energy operation to the response using the “8-MeV” beam energy operation.  It 
can be seen that the material-to-material type ratio variations increase with increasing electron beam 
energies.  For any given beam energy, HEU consistently shows the largest ratios while thorium presents 
the smallest. 
Table 3 presents predicted dual-beam energy delayed ratio results for HEU and DU when 
surrounded with low atomic number (i.e., polyethylene) and high atomic number (i.e., lead) shield 
configurations.  It is interesting to note that these delay response ratios remain relatively unchanged for a 
given nuclear material for most shielding scenarios.  For example, bare HEU has a 11-MeV/8-MeV 
delayed response ratio of 15.71 and response ratios of 15.88 and 15.83 for the 10.16-cm polyethylene and 
5.08-cm lead shielded configurations.  The notable exceptions appear to be when the shielding begins to 
significantly reduce photonuclear neutron production and delayed neutron emissions.  This effect can be 
observed for the HEU case with 10.16-cm of lead shielding.  In this latter case, only about 0.5% of any 8-
MeV photons are transmitted through the lead shield to contribute to the photofission process. 
Table 3.  Shielded nuclear material dual-beam energy delayed response ratios. 
Shield Material 
Type 
 Shield 
Thickness 
(cm) 
 Nuclear 
Material 
Type 
 
10-MeV Response/ 
8-MeV Response 
 
11-MeV Response/ 
8-MeV Response 
None  N/A  DU  5.06  12.00 
    HEU  7.14  15.71 
Polyethylene  10.16  DU  5.91  12.73 
    HEU  7.06  15.88 
  20.32  DU  5.98  12.20 
    HEU  7.78  16.67 
Lead  5.08  DU  6.31  12.31 
    HEU  7.83  15.83 
  10.16  DU  6.03  13.42 
    HEU  11.00  24.00 
 
  8 
5. EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
This experimental assessment has been divided into two phases.  The first phase involved the initial 
proof-of-concept tests to measure the basic delayed neutron responses from selected nuclear materials 
surrounded by various shield materials.  The second phase involved a follow-on test providing a 
repeatability study using an improved accelerator power supply and additional characterizations of 
selective shield and nuclear material types.  The latter included a cargo container shield assessment. 
The standard GNT interrogation configuration was used as much as possib le.  This standard 
configuration, shown in Figure 4, shows the accelerator (the box located in the upper center) positioned 
with its bremsstrahlung source at one meter from the center of the interrogated object (represented in this 
figure by the tin can located on the table).  For this assessment each electron pulse was 3.5-µs wide and 
was generated at a pulse rate of 125 Hz (i.e., 8 ms between each pulse).  The tripod-mounted GNT 
neutron detector is positioned at right angle from the accelerator beam centerline and at one meter 
from the interrogated object.  The electron accelerator uses a tungsten collimator having a maximum 
±15 degrees divergence to control the forward extent of the bremsstrahlung output emission.  The three 
“nominal” electron beam energy spectra used in these nuclear material detection tests are shown in 
Figure 5.  They have been labeled as the “8-MeV,” “10-MeV,” and “11-MeV” spectra. 
 
Figure 4.  Standard GNT testing configuration. 
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Figure 5.  The “nominal” electron energy spectra selected. 
In all cases the accelerator operation resulted in a photon dose to the interrogated object.  This dose 
was initially measured by an air ionization chamber placed on the beam centerline at one-meter from the 
accelerator bremsstrahlung source.  This average dose rate at one meter from the x-ray source was 250, 
120, and 100 R/min for the nominal 11-, 10-, and 8-MeV operation, respectively.  For general dose 
monitoring of each test operation, the ionization chamber was located at the accelerator table pla tform 
near the bremsstrahlung source. 
5.1 PROOF-OF-CONCEPT TESTS 
The initial proof-of-concept tests were performed at TA-18 during December 13-17, 1999.  The 
primary objectives of this phase of the assessment were to assess the detection of delayed neutron 
emissions from shielded nuclear material and measure the electron beam energy dependence. 
5.1.1 Nuclear Material and Shield Configurations 
The HEU material used in these tests were not the hemispherical shells used in the numerical 
prediction section (see Section 4) but rather a solid 4.8-kg HEU sphere.  As indicated previously, the total 
material amount was selected to be within the criticality safety limits for these tests.  The second nuclear 
material was a 5-kg, multiple-object DU target consisting of a 2-kg sphere, 2-kg billet, and a 1-kg slug.  
Both of these nuclear material targets are shown in Figure 6.  Throughout this assessment, the relative 
positioning of each DU object was maintained. 
In addition to assessing the response of the bare nuclear materials, various shielded configurations 
were investigated.  These configurations included 10.16 and 19.05 cm of polyethylene (Figure 7), 5.08 
and 10.16 cm of lead (Figure 8), and composite shields of 5.08 cm of lead and 10.16 cm of borated 
polyethylene (Figure 9). 
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Figure 6.  HEU (left) and DU targets used in the assessment. 
 
Figure 7.  HEU shielded with 10.16 cm (left) and 19.05 cm of polyethylene. 
 
Figure 8.  HEU shielded by 5.08 (left) and 10.16 cm of lead. 
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Figure 9.  HEU shielded by composites of lead (5.08) and borated polyethylene (10.16 cm). 
5.1.2 Accelerator Operational Repeatability 
To assess repeatability in the operation of the accelerator, the electron beam spectra were acquired 
at various times throughout each test phase.  Figures 10 through 12 show the variability of each 
“nominal” energy spectra throughout the initial Proof-of-Concept tests.  The legends associated with each 
spectrum in these figures are identified with a code – MMDDX, where “MM” is the month, “DD” is the 
day, and “X” is a test specific identifier.  While the spectra are not identical, especially for the “10-MeV” 
case, their overall characteristics do show a great degree of repeatability. 
 
Figure 10.  Electron beam energy spectra for a nominal 8-MeV operation. 
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Figure 11.  Electron beam energy spectra for a nominal 10-MeV operation. 
 
Figure 12.  Electron beam energy spectra for a nominal 11-MeV operation. 
5.1.3 Delayed Neutrons 
Typical acquired temporal spectra for a representative shielded configuration with and without 
nuclear material are presented in Figure 13.  All proof-of-concept test data were acquired in a 300-second 
period.  In these spectra, a temporal region of 1.905 to 7.665 ms (corresponding to channel region 128 to 
512) was selected to define the delayed neutron region after each accelerator pulse.  The maximum time 
between each accelerator pulse is 8 ms.  The dotted horizontal lines included in this figure indicate the 
average counts per channel in a given detector.  For this example the value is 18.182 when the nuclear 
material is present and 0.034 when the nuclear material is removed.  These average values are 
immediately available to the user after an acquisition is completed. 
For this interrogation method, Figure 14 shows the comparison of the numerical predictions and 
corresponding experimental results of the delayed counts for HEU in the non-shielded case.  The 
predictions are based on the 5.5-kg hemispherical shell configuration discussed in section 4 and a slightly 
larger defined delayed region (i.e., 1.188 to 7.665 ms after each accelerator pulse).  The excellent  
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Figure 13.  Typical 300-s acquired temporal spectra. 
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Figure 14.  Delayed counts from unshielded HEU for various electron beam energies. 
comparisons show the nuclear material configuration flexibility of this technique.  It is estimated that the 
electron beam energy error is ±0.25 MeV and the delayed count data error is about ±2 percent. 
Table 4 shows the average delayed neutron count rate (and one sigma counting error) in the GNT 
detector assembly (i.e., neutron counts per second) for the various nuclear materials and shield 
configurations studied in the December test.  As indicated previously, each test was acquired for 300 s.  
“Poly” indicates polyethylene and “Bpoly” represents a borated-polyethylene loaded with about 4 percent 
(by weight) boron.  For any given energy operation, the delayed neutron response is evident at all three 
nominal beam energies and increases with increased beam energy.  For the unshielded cases, the HEU 
response is almost twice the DU response at all nominal energies.  For the shielded cases, the nuclear 
material differences are more pronounced with increasing nominal beam energies, especially for the 
maximum shield configurations. 
The maximum delayed neutron counting rate (in the delayed region) with no nuclear material 
present in any shielded configuration was 0.24 counts/s for the nominal “8-MeV” operation, 0.33 counts/s 
for the “10-MeV” operation, and 0.36 counts/s for the “11-MeV” case.  These data are presented without 
any “room-only” generated background corrections.  Clearly a counting rate in excess of an established 
“background level” for a given accelerator operation will indicate the presence of nuclear material even 
with composite shielding. 
5.1.4 Dual-Beam Energy FOM Ratio 
In an attempt to identify and/or discriminate nuclear material that has already been indicated (via 
above-background, “delayed” region response) from the first nominal beam energy operation, a dual-
beam energy FOM ratio is obtained from the use of a second beam energy operation.  Table 5 presents 
these FOM ratios and a one sigma error for all the bare and shielded cases studied during this test phase.  
Included for the reader’s convenience is the prediction FOMs based on mono-energetic electrons as 
presented in Table 3.  In all cases the experimental FOMs are less than the predicted and the resulting 
errors are larger than expected.  However, the FOM data trend (3 to 7 for the “10-MeV/8-MeV” ratio and 
9 to 15 for the “11-MeV/8-MeV” ratio) shows HEU with the largest value for each case studied and a 
relative magnitude consistency for each shield case. 
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Table 4.  Average neutron count rate (counts/s) in the defined “delayed” region for three nominal beam 
energies. 
  GNT  
Case  8-MeV  Error  10-MeV  Error  11-MeV  Error 
Bare             
  DU  24.49  0.29  35.60  0.34  47.05  0.40 
  HEU  36.91  0.35  64.95  0.47  96.60  0.57 
             
10.16 cm Poly  0.16  0.02  0.20  0.03  0.24  0.03 
  DU  1.64  0.07  2.75  0.10  3.52  0.11 
  HEU  5.15  0.13  8.90  0.17  10.85  0.19 
             
19.05 cm Poly             
  DU  1.13  0.06  1.74  0.08  2.25  0.09 
  HEU  1.89  0.08  3.55  0.11  5.23  0.13 
             
5.08 cm Pb             
  Pb Only  0.22  0.03  0.30  0.03  0.36  0.03 
  DU  2.19  0.09  3.77  0.11  5.01  0.13 
  HEU  4.45  0.12  9.25  0.18  12.62  0.21 
             
10.16 cm Pb             
  Pb Only  0.24  0.03  0.30  0.03  0.33  0.03 
  DU  0.58  0.04  1.13  0.06  1.73  0.08 
  HEU  2.07  0.08  5.02  0.13  6.02  0.14 
             
5.08 cm Pb (IN)/10.16 cm Bpoly             
  Pb/Bpoly Only  0.17  0.02  0.24  0.03  0.31  0.03 
  DU  0.43  0.04  0.71  0.05  0.89  0.05 
  HEU  1.21  0.06  2.27  0.09  3.07  0.10 
             
10.16 cm Bpoly/5.08 cm Pb (out)             
  Bpoly/Pb Only  0.21  0.03  0.25  0.03  0.37  0.04 
  DU  0.39  0.04  0.46  0.04  0.66  0.05 
  HEU  0.65  0.05  1.25  0.06  1.58  0.07 
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Table 5.  Dual-beam energy FOM ratios for various cases studied. 
Energy Ratios 
  10-MeV/8-MeV  11-MeV/8-MeV 
GNT (avg.) Case  Measurement  Error  Calculation  Measurement  Error  Calculation 
Bare              
  DU  3.71  0.06  5.60  8.90  0.13  12.00 
  HEU  4.26  0.05  7.14  11.48  0.14  15.71 
             
10.16 cm Poly  3.57  0.69  —  6.71  1.25  — 
  DU  4.36  0.25  5.91  10.42  0.57  12.73 
  HEU  4.22  0.14  7.06  10.22  0.32  15.88 
             
19.05 cm Poly             
  Poly Only             
  DU  3.92  0.27  5.98  9.62  0.64  12.20 
  HEU  4.37  0.23  7.78  11.67  0.57  16.67 
             
5.08 cm Pb             
  Pb Only  3.40  0.55  —  8.07  1.25  — 
  DU  4.11  0.20  6.31  11.16  0.52  12.31 
  HEU  5.55  0.19  7.83  14.17  0.46  15.83 
             
10.16 cm Pb             
  Pb Only  3.30  0.52  —  6.20  0.96  — 
  DU  5.08  0.47  6.03  14.47  1.27  13.42 
  HEU  5.91  0.28  11.00  14.48  0.68  24.00 
             
5.08 cm Pb (IN)/10.16 cm Bpoly             
  Pb/Bpoly Only  3.50  0.64  —  8.76  1.51  — 
  DU  4.31  0.48  —  9.82  1.06  — 
  HEU  4.84  0.31  —  11.90  0.74  — 
             
10.16 cm Bpoly/5.08 cm Pb (out)             
  Bpoly/Pb Only  3.15  0.54  —  8.07  1.27  — 
  DU  3.17  0.40  —  7.71  0.90  — 
  HEU  5.03  0.44  —  11.48  0.98  — 
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5.2 FOLLOW-ON TESTS 
Follow-on experiments were performed during May 1-5, 2000.  As with the initial December tests, 
these tests were performed in the basement of the LANL TA-18 building.  In this second test series, a 
modification to the accelerator’s pulsed, radio-frequency power supply was made to improve run-to-run 
operational performance.  In addition, to assure better counting statistics in all acquired data, each data 
acquisition was for 600 s instead of the earlier 300 s operations.  The specific objectives of the follow-on 
tests were to:  1) assess the accelerator operational performance with the modified power supply, 2) 
demonstrate repeatability of the December test results, 3) assess thorium material, 4) assess additional 
shielding configurations and cargo container effects, and 5) assess composite nuclear material. 
5.2.1 Electron Beam Spectra Performance Assessment 
The initial December tests used an accelerator power supply containing a magnetron with a 
constant magnetic field.  To enhance the electron beam energy selection process for a given accelerator 
operation, a water-cooled electromagnet (EEV, Inc, Model 4261S) was added to the tunable, S-Band, 
magnetron (EVV, Inc., Model 5167).  The addition of the electromagnet was quite useful in increasing 
our ability to “tune” the magnetron for a desired operation, especially to help obtain a selected maximum 
beam energy.  The latter is of course critical to this interrogation technique.  Figures 15 to 17 show the 
measured electron beam profiles obtained at various times throughout these follow-on tests.  Note the 
excellent overlap of the higher energy regions.  Also seen in these figures are random, single-channel, 
noise spikes.  Investigations are continuing into the possible source(s) of this electrical noise.  As yet, no 
negative effects have been identified as a result of these spikes. 
One undesirable side effect of the enhanced “tuning” flexibility at higher beam energies is a slight 
reduction of the control of the lower energy portion of a spectrum.  Since the lower energy electrons 
contribute very little, if any, to the functionality of this interrogation technique, these minor variations are 
quite acceptable. 
 
Figure 15.  Electron beam energy spectra for a nominal 11-MeV operation. 
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Figure 16.  Electron beam energy spectra for a nominal 10-MeV operation. 
 
Figure 17.  Electron beam energy spectra for a nominal 8-MeV operation. 
5.2.2 Uranium Repeatability and Thorium Results 
The 4.8-kg sphere of HEU used in the December tests was used to perform a repeatability 
assessment.  As in the initial tests, the sphere was positioned at 1-meter from both the detector and the 
accelerator’s x-ray source.  Figure 18 shows the delayed count per coulomb for the three nominal beam 
energies.  Note the excellent comparison and repeatability between data acquired almost five months 
apart and involving two complete experimental set-ups and tear-downs. 
In addition, a 22-kg thorium target was also assessed.  The thorium was configured as two, 11-kg 
disks having an approximate 38.1-cm diameter.  Table 6 presents the “10/8-MeV” and “11/8-MeV” 
delayed count FOM ratios for the thorium and uranium nuclear materials.  Comparison to Table 3 
(calculated) shows that the “10/8-MeV” data compares well; however, the “11/8-MeV” results have 
increased from the initial December tests and now compare much better to the predicted results.  The 
higher energy FOM improvement is be lieved to be due to better counting statistics arising from the 600 s 
acquisition period and the improved beam energy selection capability.  Thorium ratios, especially for the 
“11/8-MeV” case, are much less than either DU or HEU. 
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Figure 18.  Delayed counts per coulomb comparisons from a 4.8-kg HEU sphere. 
Table 6.  Dual-beam energy FOM ratios for bare nuclear materials in the follow-on tests. 
  10-MeV/8-MeV  11-MeV/8-MeV 
GNT (avg) 
Case 
 
Measurement 
 
Error 
 
Calculation 
 
Measurement 
 
Error 
 
Calculation 
Bare              
  DU  3.98  0.04  5.06  11.60  0.12  12.00 
  HEU  4.72  0.04  7.14  14.40  0.13  15.71 
  Th  3.05  0.05  4.05  6.75  0.10  6.82 
 
5.2.3 Additional Shielding and Cargo Container Results 
Polyethylene-filled waste drums were used to show the effects of different shield configurations.  
Drums provided photon/neutron shielding that effectively enclosed a nuclear material within a relatively 
compact configuration.  One such drum, along with an interrogation set-up, is shown in Figure 19. 
Two standard “55-gallon” drums were used.  Centered in each drum was a 20.32-cm diameter, 1-
cm thick, polyethylene-type tube pipe into which the nuclear material was inserted.  Each drum was filled 
with polyethylene outside the inner tube pipe.  The first drum, referred to as Barrel #1, had a net 
polyethylene weight of approximately 100 kg consisting of small “BB-sized” balls.  This configuration 
resulted in very dense packing having an effective solid polyethylene thickness of about approximately 
10 cm.  The second drum (i.e., Barrel #2) had a net weight of 16.3 kg consisting of 4.45-cm diameter, 
“ping-pong” balls.  The effective solid polyethylene shield thickness for the latter configuration was about 
1.5 cm.  Table 7 presents the electron beam energy-dependent, delay count ratios for the drum 
interrogations.  When comparing these data to the unshielded uranium case data presented in Table 5, 
each nuclear material placed within each drum was detected and discriminated. 
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Figure 19.  Polyethylene-filled drums used to provide shielding for nuclear material located inside the 
center hole.  [Barrel #2 is shown with its top removed.] 
Table 7.  Dual-beam energy FOM ratios for uranium in polyethylene-filled drums. 
10-MeV/8-MeV 11-MeV/8-MeV GNT (avg) 
Case 
 
Measurement  Error 
 
Measurement  Error 
Barrel #2         
  DU  4.05  0.06  11.20  0.14 
  HEU  4.94  0.06  14.20  0.16 
          
Barrel #1         
  DU  4.60  0.29  11.70  0.70 
  HEU  4.91  0.17  14.80  0.49 
 
Another shielding scenario focused on the effects of shielded nuclear material detection and 
discrimination when located inside a steel cargo container.  To investigate this effect a half-length, 
standard-sized transport container was lowered into the LANL facility basement.  The electron accelerator 
and detector were positioned at the double -door end of the container.  The polyethylene-filled drum was 
placed inside the container.  This configuration is shown in Figure 20. 
The drum was positioned, behind the doors, so as to have the standard 1-meter accelerator-to-
uranium target and uranium target-to-detector distances.  Table 8 presents the dual-beam energy FOM 
ratios for the cargo container study.  Again good discrimination of the uranium material type is noted. 
 
  21 
 
Figure 20.  Drum positioned within the transport container and behind a container door. 
Table 8.  Dual-beam energy FOM ratios for uranium in polyethylene-filled drums located within a 
transport container. 
10-MeV/8-MeV 11-MeV/8-MeV GNT (avg) 
Case  Measurement  Error  Measurement  Error 
Barrel #2             
  DU  4.00  0.06  11.30  0.16 
  HEU  4.21  0.05  13.10  0.15 
          
Barrel #1             
  DU  3.72  0.25  10.80  0.69 
  HEU  4.47  0.18  14.30  0.54 
 
5.2.4 Composite Uranium Material Assessment 
An assessment was performed to study unshielded, composite nuclear materials.  In this case, the 
multi-object DU material was positioned around the HEU sphere as shown in Figure 21.  The 4.8-kg 
sphere was positioned at one meter from the accelerator (i.e., x-ray source) and was always directly 
exposed to the interrogating photons.  Table 9 presents the delayed neutron ratios as a function of 
decreasing quantities of DU.  With HEU present in a given composite configuration, the delayed count 
ratio is always above 13 for the “11/8-MeV” case and above four for the other case.  Future assessments 
will include nuclear and non-nuclear shielding effects. 
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Figure 21.  Unshielded composite uranium target.  [Right and left views.] 
Table 9.  Dual-beam energy FOM ratios for unshielded composite uranium. 
  10-MeV/8-MeV  11-MeV/8-MeV 
GNT (avg) Case  Measurement  Error  Measurement  Error 
DU (5kg)  3.98  0.04   11.60  0.12  
DU (5kg) & HEU (4.8kg)  4.45  0.04  14.00  0.10 
DU (3kg) & HEU (4.8kg)  4.92  0.04  13.10  0.10 
HEU (4.8kg)  4.72  0.04  14.40  0.13 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A photonuclear interrogation method was experimentally assessed for the detection of shielded 
nuclear materials.  The technique uses energetic (up to 12 MeV) bremsstrahlung radiation to penetrate and 
induce photofission events in nuclear materials surrounded by various shield materials.  The delayed 
neutron response from the fission events allows direct nuclear material detection and, for most shielded 
configurations, allows neutron multiplication for neutron-induced fissions.  The latter is observed in HEU 
materials.  Comparing the delayed neutron responses between different energy bremsstrahlung 
interrogations allows nuclear material identification and/or discrimination.  This experimental assessment 
used three “nominal” electron beam energies; 8, 10, and 11 MeV.  The corresponding photon dose rates at 
a meter corresponding to these operations are 100, 120, and 250 R/min, respectively.  The nuclear 
materials selected include a solid 4.8-kg HEU sphere, a 5-kg multiple-object, depleted uranium (DU) 
[uranium with about 0.2% enrichment with U-235] target, and two 11-kg thorium disks.  Polyethylene, 
borated-polyethylene, and lead were selected as the shield materials. 
All tests were performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-18 facility and used the 
INEEL Gamma Neutron Threshold (GNT) Technology which includes a transportable, selectable -energy, 
electron accelerator (i.e., VARITRON) and a neutron detection system.  This experimental assessment 
was conducted in two phases.  The initial phase was conducted in December of 1999.  It concentrated on 
the stimulation and detection of delayed neutron responses from various shielded nuclear material 
configurations.  A follow-on test, performed in May of 2000, built on the results of the initial tests, 
focused on selected shield and nuclear material response characterizations, and allowed the evaluation of 
a modified accelerator power supply to enhance accelerator operation (i.e., improved beam energy 
control).  For each test phase, the accelerator system was completely set-up and operational in the facility 
basement within four hours of arrival using a four-man team.  With the same team, the system was 
completely packed-up and truck-loaded in slightly over two hours. 
The initial proof-of-concept tests showed that the selected HEU and depleted uranium samples 
could be detected (above background) through the maximum shield thickness used in these tests: 19.05-
cm polyethylene and 10.16 cm lead.  Higher nominal electron beam operations allowed larger delayed 
neutron responses due to the nonlinear increase in bremsstrahlung radiation with electron beam energy.  
Using ratios of the delayed region response per electron beam charge (Coulombs) for different energy 
interrogations (also referred to as the dual-beam energy FOM ratio) showed trends which indicate 
selected nuclear material differentiation.  Trend variations for a given material appear to be the combined 
result of insufficient counting statistics and accelerator operation repeatability uncertainties.  
Corresponding predictions show that this material dependent ratio is relatively independent for the shield 
materials studied in this assessment.  This is primarily due to the nearly constant penetration capability of 
the photons in this 8 – 12 MeV energy range and the high transmission of the energetic induced neutrons. 
In the follow-on tests, the modification of the accelerator’s power supply using a magnetic field-
variable, electromagnet with the magnetron unit significantly improved the accelerator’s run-to-run 
repeatability.  Specifically, the user had selective control of the energy spectrum of the accelerated 
electrons.  This improved operation, combined with 600-second acquisitions, showed HEU results with 
excellent agreement to both the initial December tests and the earlier predictions.  In addition, the “11-
MeV/8-MeV” FOM ratios for all the unshielded nuclear material cases, including the thorium material, 
resembled the original predicted ratios (e.g., DU = 11.60 [12.00 pred.], HEU = 14.40 [15.71], and Th = 
6.75 [6.82]).  Steel drums, filled with various polyethylene material densities, also showed very similar 
FOM ratios when the uranium material was positioned within the drum; even when a drum is positioned 
within a cargo container!  A final study investigated the effects of an irradiation of an unshielded 
composite uranium configuration.  In the selected configuration, the mass of multi-object, DU material 
was positioned behind and on either side of the HEU.  The entire composite configuration was irradiated 
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and centered with the accelerator beam line.  With HEU present, a 3- or 5-kg DU mass maintained the 
FOM ratio above 13.1. 
This interrogation technique appears to be able to detect kilogram quantities of nuclear material 
surrounded by shielding material that would easily preclude any passive detection.  This detection is via 
the delayed neutron response resulting from the direct photofission events and subsequent neutron-
induced fission events.  More composite shielded and unshielded nuclear material configuration tests 
should be performed to study the predicted consistency in the HEU-indicating FOM ratios.  These latter 
tests will benefit from another accelerator enhancement, currently being assessed and developed, that uses 
an intelligent, multi-variant analysis method to identify and correct minor variations during an accelerator 
operation.  In addition, a larger detector can considerably decrease detection times and allow increased 
stand-off interrogation distances.  An INEEL/LANL collaboration is addressing this recommendation for 
truck and cargo container detection applications.  INEEL plans to develop other GNT-type detectors 
(smaller than LANL’s detector but larger than the GNT detector used in this study) in early FY01 to 
complement this detection process by discriminating and locating the shielded nuclear material. 
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